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Introduction
When in the course of observations it becomes necessary for agents to arrive at a generalization, they should declare, along with their conjecture, the extent of their certainty. The problem of induction seems formidable if a standard of absolute certainty is imposed on the learner. Indeed, as is well-known in Philosophy of Science, the so-called problem of empirical underdetermination (i.e., the fact that typically the data are compatible with more than one hypothesis) rules out any chance of obtaining infallible knowledge in empirical research. But apart from the conclusions based on absolute certainty (cf. [13, 10, 15] ), learners can produce hypotheses based on beliefs. It is thus strange that Formal Learning Theory and Belief Revision Theory developed completely independently from each other, and that they have generally maintained their distance ever since.
However, there does exist a line of research that combines belief revision with learning-theoretic notions, line pursued by Kelly [21, 26] , Kelly, Schulte and Hendricks [19] , Martin and Osherson [28] and ourselves [13, 3, 4, 14] . In this paper we continue this research program, using topological characterizations and methods.
An inductive problem consists of a state space, a family of "potential observations", and a "question" (i.e., a partition of the state space). These observations provide data for learning. The problem is solvable if there exists a learner that, after observing "enough" pieces of data, eventually stabilizes on the correct answer. A special case of solvability is learnability in the limit, corresponding to the solvability of the "ultimate" question: 'What is the actual state of the world?'. This notion matches the usual learningtheoretic concept of identifiability in the limit [31, 16, 29] .
The aim of the paper is twofold. First, we give topological characterizations of the notions of solvability (and learnability), in terms of topological separation principles. Intuitively, the ability to reliably learn the true answer to a question, is related to the possibility to "separate" answers by observations. The second goal is to use these topological results to look at the "solving power" of well-behaved doxastic agents, such as the ones whose beliefs satisfy the usual KD45 postulates of doxastic logic, as well as the standard AGM postulates of rational belief-revision [1] . We look at a particularly simple and canonical type of doxastic agent, who forms beliefs by AGM conditioning.
Our main result is that AGM conditioning is universal for problem-solving, i.e., that every solvable problem can be solved by AGM conditioning. This means that (contrary to some prior claims), AGM belief-revision postulates are not an obstacle to problem-solving. As a special case, it follows that AGM conditioning is also "universal for learning" (every learnable space can be learned by conditioning). 1 The close connections between Epistemology and General Topology have already been noticed long ago [32, 20] . Based on these connections, Kevin Kelly started a far-reaching program [20, 22] meant to import ideas and techniques from both Formal Learning Theory and Topology into mainstream Epistemology, and show their relevance to the induction problem in Philosophy of Science. A further connection is the one with Ockham's Razor, that would (...) guarantee that always choosing the simplest theory compatible with experience and hanging on to it while it remains the simplest is both necessary and sufficient for efficiency of inquiry. [22] Simplicity has been claimed to have topological characteristics-the simplicity order should in some way follow the structure imposed on the uncertainty range by possible tests and observations. It has also been linked with the notion of minimal mind change, where the learning agent keeps the conjecture changes to a minimum [20, 30] .
Taken together, our results can be seen as a vindication both of the general topological program in Inductive Epistemology [20, 22] and of the AGM Belief Revision Theory [1] . On the first front, our general topological characterizations of learning-theoretic concepts seem to confirm Kelly's longstanding claim that Inductive Epistemology can be seen mathematically as a branch of General Topology. On the second front, our universality result seems to vindicate Belief Revision Theory as a canonical form of learning. 2 2 Epistemic Spaces and Inductive Problems Definition 1. An epistemic space is a pair S = (S, O) consisting of a state space S and a countable (or finite) set of observable properties ("data") O ⊆ P(S). We denote by by O s := {O ∈ O | s ∈ O} the set of all observable properties (holding) at a given state s.
One can think of the states in S as "possible worlds", in the tradition of Kripke and Lewis. The sets O ∈ O represent properties of the world that are in principle observable: if true, such a property will eventually be observed (although there is no upper bound on the time needed to come to observe it).
To keep things simple, we assume that at each step of the learning process only one property is observed. As for the countability of the set O, it is natural to think of observables as properties which can be expressed by means of a language or numerical coding system, generated from a grammar with a finite vocabulary. Any such family O will be (at most) countable.
We denote by O ∩ the family of all finite intersections of observations from O, and by O * the family of all finite sequences of observations. Such a finite sequence The intuition is that at stage n of a data stream, the agent observes the information in O n . A data stream captures a possible future history of observations in its entirety, while a data sequence captures only a finite part of such a history.
Given a state s ∈ S, a data stream for s is a stream
Such a stream is "sound" (every data in O is true at s) and "complete" (every true data is entailed by some finite set of observations in O).
Example 1. Let our epistemic space S = (S, O) be the real numbers, with observable properties given by open intervals with rational endpoints: S
:= R, O := {(a, b) | a, b ∈ Q, a ≤ b}, where (a, b) := {x ∈ R | a < x < b}.
For instance, observables may represent measurements of a physical quantity (such as a position along a one-dimensional line) that takes real numbers as its possible values. In such case, for
any state x ∈ R and any two sequences a n , b n ∈ Q of rational numbers, such that a n ≤ x ≤ b n and both sequences converge to x, the sequence (a 0 , b 0 ), . . . , (a n , b n ), . . . is a (sound and complete) data stream for x.
Other examples include standard n-dimensional Euclidean spaces, e.g., S = R 3 with O consisting of all open balls with rational radius and center.
Definition 2.
An inductive problem is a pair P = (S, Q) consisting of an epistemic space S = (S, O) together with a "question" Q, i.e., a partition 3 of S. The cells A i of the partition Q are called answers. Given s ∈ S, the unique A ∈ Q with s ∈ A is called the answer to Q at s, and denoted A s . We say that a problem P ′ = (S, Q ′ ) is a refinement of another problem P = (S, Q) (or that the corresponding question Q ′ is a refinement of the question Q) if every answer of Q is a disjoint union of answers of Q ′ .
The most refined question concerns the identity of the real world. 
Intuitively, after observing the data sequence σ = (σ 0 , . . . , σ n ), we can say that agent L believes a proposition P after observing the data sequence σ = (σ 0 , . . . , σ n ), and write B σ L P iff P ∈ L S (σ 0 , . . . , σ n ). We can also interpret this as a conditional belief, rather than as revised belief, the agent believes every P ∈ L S (σ 0 , . . . , σ n ) conditional on σ 0 , . . . , σ n . However, in the end we are of course interested in the actual revised beliefs after observing the data, so the assumption in this case is that conditional beliefs guide the agent's revision strategy: they "pre-encode" future belief revisions, to use a term coined by Johan van Benthem [6] . The above consistency simply means that each of the agent's beliefs is consistent whenever the observed data are consistent.
A doxastic agent is one whose set L S (σ 0 , . . . , σ n ) of beliefs forms a (proper) filter on S when observing consistent data; in other words, her beliefs are (consistent when possible, and also) inferenceclosed (i.e., if
Hence, for any doxastic agent L and every consistent data sequence σ , the belief operator B σ L (as defined above) satisfy the usual KD45 axioms of doxastic logic.
A standard agent is a doxastic agent L whose beliefs form a principal filter, i.e., all her beliefs are entailed by one "strongest belief"; formally, a doxastic agent L is standard iff for every data sequence σ over any epistemic space S there exists some set L S ( σ ), such that
It is easy to see that in this case, we must have L S ( σ) = L S ( σ ). Indeed, we can equivalently define a doxastic agent L to be standard iff L S ( σ ) ∈ L S ( σ ) holds for all data sequences σ . Standard agents are globally consistent whenever possible: L S (σ 0 , . . . , σ n ) = / 0 whenever n i=o σ i = / 0. Traditional learning methods in Formal Learning Theory correspond to our standard agents, and they are typically identified with the map L (given by L S (σ 0 , . . . , σ n ) := L S (σ 0 , . . . , σ n )). From now on we follow this tradition, and refer to standard agents using the map L. But in general we do not restrict ourselves to standard agents.
An AGM agent is an agent L ≤ who forms beliefs by AGM conditioning, i.e., it comes endowed with a map that associates any epistemic space S some total preorder 4 ≤ S on S, called "prior" plausibility relation; and whose beliefs after observing any data sequence σ = (σ 0 , . . . , σ n ) are given by
Intuitively, t ≤ s means that t is at least as plausible as s (according to our agent). So, an AGM agent believes P conditional on a data sequence σ iff P is true in all the states (consistent with the data) that are "plausible enough".
It is easy to see that every AGM agent is a doxastic agent: L ≤ S ( σ ) is a proper filter whenever n i=0 σ i = / 0; hence, the beliefs of an AGM agent satisfy the usual KD45 axioms of doxastic logic (when learning any consistent data sequence).
Moreover, it is well-known that in fact, the beliefs of AGM agents satisfy all the so-called AGM axioms from Belief Revision Theory [1] : if, for any data sequence σ = (σ 0 , . . . , σ n ), we set T = L (σ 0 , . . . , σ n ), and for any new observation φ ∈ O we set T * φ = L (σ 0 , . . . , σ n , φ ), then the resulting revision operator * satisfies all the AGM postulates. In fact, for any AGM agent L , if we interpret the operator B σ L (as defined above) as representing a conditional belief B σ 0 ∧...∧σ n , then the sound and complete logic of these conditional belief operators is the so-called Conditional Doxastic Logic [8, 5] (which is itself just a repackaging of the AGM postulates in the language of conditional logic).
Observation 1. Given a total preorder ≤ on S and a subset A ⊆ S, set
In general though, the filter L ≤ S ( σ ) is not principal. So AGM agents are not necessarily standard agents. But there is an important case when they are standard: whenever the preorder ≤ S is well-founded in every space S (i.e., there are no infinite chains s 0 > s 1 > s 2 . . . of more and more plausible states). It is easy to see that the map L associated to a standard AGM agent is given by the set of ≤-minimal states consistent with the data:
Intuitively, this means that a standard AGM agent believes a proposition P iff P is true in all the "most plausible" states consistent with the data.
The original semantics of AGM belief was given using only standard AGM agents. But this semantics was in fact borrowed by Grove [18] from Lewis' semantics for conditionals [27] , which did not assume well-foundedness. 5 
Definition 4. Let S be an epistemic space. An agent L verifies a proposition A ⊆ S in the limit if, for every state s ∈ S and every data stream O for s, we have s ∈ A iff there exists some k
is verifiable in the limit if there exists some agent that verifies A in the limit. 6 An agent L falsifies a proposition A ⊆ S in the limit if, for every state s ∈ S and every data stream for O for s, we have s / ∈ A iff there exists some k
as in the rest of this paper, X c := S \ X stands for the complement of X ). For a standard agent, this means L(S, O[n]) ⊆ A c for all n ≥ k,
A proposition A ⊆ S is falsifiable in the limit if there exists some agent that falsifies A in the limit. A proposition A ⊆ S is decidable in the limit if it is both verifiable and falsifiable in the limit. Note that standard learnability is essentially the same as Gold's identifiability in the limit [29, 17] . Examples and Counterexamples: An example of non-learnable space S = (S, O) is obtained by taking four abstract states S = {s,t, u, w} and two observable properties O = {V,U }, with V = {s,t, u} and U = {t, u, w}, as depicted in Figure 2 . Since states s and t satisfy the same observable properties, no learning method will ever distinguish them. But even spaces in which no two states satisfy the same observations can still be non-learnable, e.g., all the n-dimensional Euclidean spaces from Example 1 are not learnable (though, as we will see, many questions are solvable and many subsets are decidable over these spaces). Another example of non-learnable space is given in Figure 3 : formally, S = (S, O), where S := {s n | n ∈ ω} ∪ {s ∞ }, and O = {O i | i ∈ ω}, and for any i ∈ ω, In contrast, an example of learnable space is in Figure 4 : formally, S = {s n | n ∈ ω} consists of countably many distinct states, with O = {O n | n ∈ ω}, where O n = {s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n }. A standard agent that can learn this space in the limit is given by setting L(σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) to be the maximum number (in the natural order) in n i=0 σ i , whenever there is such a maximum number, and setting L(σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) := n i=0 σ i otherwise. Proposition 1. Let S be an epistemic space, A ⊆ S a proposition and P = (S, Q) an inductive problem.
An agent L solves a problem P = (S, Q) if, for every state s ∈ S and every data stream O for s, there exists some k
∈ ω such that A s ∈ L S ( O[n]) for all n ≥ k (recallO i := {s i , s i+1 , . . .} ∪ {s ∞ }. s 0 s 1 s 2 s 3 s ∞ O 0 O 1 O 2 O 3 . . .
Then we have the following:
• A is verifiable (falsifiable, decidable) in the limit iff it is standardly verifiable (falsifiable, decidable) in the limit.
• P is solvable iff it is standardly solvable. • S is learnable iff it is standardly learnable.
Proof. Let A ⊆ S be a set that is verifiable (falsifiable, decidable) by an agent L on an epistemic space S. We construct a standard agent that does the same thing, by setting, for every data sequence σ ∈ O * :
Similarly, let P = (S, Q) be a problem that is solvable by L . Let ≤ be some arbitrary well-order of the set Q. (Such a well-order exists, by the Well-Ordering Theorem.) We construct a standard agent who also solves P, by setting
holds; and L S ( σ ) := S if no such answer exists. (As before, we can extend our agent to any other space
By applying this to the learning problem Q = {{s} | s ∈ S}, we obtain the similar result for learnability.
In conclusion, everything that can be learned by any agent can also be learned by some standard agent. However, this is no longer true when we restrict to more canonical types of agents (such as AGM agents). Proof. Consider a counterexample from [13, 3, 4] . Take the epistemic model from Figure 4 . This space is learnable, and thus learnable by AGM conditioning, but it is not learnable by standard conditioning. Indeed, this space is learnable by conditioning only with respect to the following non-wellfounded prior:
The Observational Topology
In this section, we assume familiarity with the following notions: topology τ (identified with its family of open subsets) over a set S of points, topological space (S, τ), open sets, closed sets, interior Int(X ) and closure X of a set X , (open) neighborhood of a point s, base of a topology and local base (of neighborhoods) at a point. We use letters U , U ′ , etc., for open sets in τ, and letters C, C ′ , etc., for closed sets.
A space is said to be second-countable if its topology has a countable base. Given a topological space (S, τ), the specialization preorder ⊑ ⊆ S × S is defined in the following way: for any s,t ∈ S, we set
Separation Principles. In this paper we use four key topological separation notions. The first is the well-known separation axiom T 0, which will be satisfied by all the topologies that arise in our setting. The second is the separation axiom T D. This condition (together with countability) will be shown to characterize learnable spaces. 
Definition 6. Given a topological space (S, τ), a set A ⊆ S is locally closed if it is the intersection A = U ∩C of an open set U with a closed set C. Equivalently, if it is of the form A = U ∩ A for some open U . A set is ω-constructible if it is a countable union of locally closed sets. A question Q (partition of S) is locally closed if all its answers are locally closed. A problem P is locally closed if its associated question is locally closed.
Essentially, locally closed questions are partitions with the property that every "answer" (i.e., partition cell) A can be separated (by an open neighborhood) from all the non-A-states that are inseparable from A. 8 Essentially, a linearly separated question is one whose answers can be totally ordered by a "plausibility" (or "simplicity") order, in such a way that every answer A can be separated (by an open neighborhood U A ⊇ A) from all answers that are "more plausible" (or "simpler") than A. From now on, we will always implicitly consider our epistemic spaces S to also be topological spaces (S, τ S ), endowed with their observational topology τ S . Every topological property possessed by the associated topological space will thus be also attributed to the epistemic space. Proof. In order to prove this, we first recall some standard topological notions and results: A set is called constructible if it is a finite disjoint union of locally closed sets. Obviously, all locally closed sets are constructible. It is known that constructible sets form a Boolean algebra, i.e., the family of constructible sets is closed under complementation, finite unions, and finite intersections.
Observation 2. Every epistemic space is T
Suppose A = i∈ω A i , where all A i are locally closed. Then we can rewrite A as a disjoint union A = i∈ω B i , where we have set
Since B i 's are generated from locally closed sets using complementation and finite intersections, they must be constructible. Hence, each B i can be written as disjoint finite unions of locally closed sets B i = 1≤ j≤i B i j . Hence, we can write A = i∈ω 1≤ j≤i B i j as a disjoint countable union of locally closed sets.
Definition 9.
A pseudo-stratification is a finite or ω-long sequence of locally closed sets A i | i < λ (where λ ∈ ω ∪ {ω}), which form a partition of S satisfying the following condition:
Proposition 4. Every countable locally closed question can be refined to a pseudo-stratification.
Proof. Suppose Π = {A i | i ∈ ω} is a countable locally closed question (partition of S). We first show the following:
Claim. There exists a family {(Π i , < i ) | i ∈ ω}, satisfying (1) each Π i is a finite partition of A i into locally closed sets; (2) each < i is a total order on Π i ;
Proof of Claim:
We construct (Π n , < n ) by recursion: for n = 0, set Π 0 := {A 0 }, with < 0 trivial. For the step n + 1: assume given {(Π i , < i ) | i ≤ n} satisfying the above four conditions (for i ≤ n). We set
where for each function f :
It is obvious that the B f 's are locally closed (given that A n+1 is locally closed) and that they form a partition of A n+1 . So condition (1) is satisfied. It is also easy to check condition (2) for i = n + 1: let j < n + 1, E ∈ Π j and B f ∈ Π n+1 . Then we have either f (E) = 0, in which case B f ⊆ E (by construction of B f ), or else f (E) = 1, in which case B f ⊆ E c .
To construct the order < n+1 , observe first that there is a natural total order < (n) on the disjoint union n i=1 Π i , namely the one obtained by concatenating the orders < 0 , < 1 , . . . , < n . More precisely, if, for
we set i(B) to be the unique index i ≤ n such that B ∈ Π i , then the order < (n) is given by setting: B < (n) E iff either i(B) < i(E), or else i(B) = i(E) and B < i(B) E.
Now, the order < n+1 on B f 's is given by the lexicographic order induced by < (n) on the functions f (thought as "words" written with the letters 0 and 1). More precisely, we set:
where < is the usual order 0 < 1 on {0, 1}. Clearly, < n+1 is a total order on Π n+1 , so condition (2) is satisfied. Finally, we check condition (4) for n + 1, let B f , B g ∈ Π n+1 such that B f < n+1 B g . By definition of the order < n+1 , this means that there exists some Given now the above Claim, we can prove our Lemma by taking as our refined partition
Clearly, Π ′ is a refinement of Π consisting of locally closed sets. We now define a well-order < ′ on Π ′ as the concatenation of all the ≤ i 's. 9 Obviously, < ′ is a total order of type ≤ ω on Π ′ , so we get finite or ω-long sequence that enumerates Π ′ . The above properties (3) and (4) ensure that this is a pseudo-stratification.
Lemma 1. Given a pseudo-stratification
Proof. We know that each A i is locally closed, so there exists some open set
Let us first check that the sequence U i | i < λ satisfies condition (1):
Second, let us check condition (2): Suppose that we have j < i and 
Lemma 2. Every pseudo-stratification is linearly separated.
Proof. Let Π = {A i | i < λ } be a pseudo-stratification (with λ ≤ ω), and let U i | i < λ be a sequence satisfying the conditions of Lemma 1. It is clear that, in order to prove our intended result, it is enough to construct a total order on the set {i ∈ ω|i < λ } = λ ⊆ ω, such that
For this, we first define a reflexive relation R on λ , by setting
Claim: There are no non-trivial cycles
Proof of Claim:
Let i 1 R · · · i n Ri 1 be a non-trivial cycle of minimal length n ≥ 2. There are two cases: Given the above Claim, it follows that the transitive closure R * is a partial order on λ (which obviously includes R). By the Order Extension Principle, we can extend R * to a total order on λ , which still includes R. Proof. Suppose not. Let A be verifiable in the limit, but such that
Topological Characterization of Solvability Definition 10. Let S = (S, O) be an epistemic space, L be a standard agent, A ⊆ S, and s ∈
A , i.e., there exists some state s ∈ A for which there is no A-locking sequence. This means that every data sequence σ that is sound for s can be extended to a sequence δ that is also sound for s and has L(δ ) ⊆ A.
Let now O be a (sound and complete) data stream for s. We construct a new infinite data stream V , by defining increasingly longer initial segments δ k of O, in countably many stages: we first set V 0 = O 0 , thus obtaining an initial segment δ 0 = (O 0 ) = (V 0 ); at the k + 1-th stage, given some initial segment δ k = (V 0 ,V 1 , . . . ,V n k ) (of some length n k ), we built our next initial segment by taking any extension δ k+1 of the sequence σ k = (V 0 , . . . ,V n k , O n+1 ) that is sound for s and has L(σ k ) ⊆ A. The resulting infinite stream V is a (sound and complete) stream for s (the completeness of V with respect to s follows the fact that this stream includes all the elements of U ), but which contains arbitrarily long initial segments σ k with L(σ k ) ⊆ A. Since s ∈ A, this contradicts the assumption that A is verifiable in the limit.
Lemma 4. If A ⊆ S is verifiable in the limit by a standard agent L, then for every data sequence
from which the desired conclusion follows.
(⊇) If s ∈ L σ A , then σ is an A-locking sequence for s, hence σ is sound for s, and thus s ∈
A . We prove two claims: Claim 1: For every data sequence δ that is sound for s and extends σ , we have L S (δ ) ⊆ A.
Proof of Claim 1: Let δ = (δ 1 , . . . , δ n ) be a data sequence that is sound for s (i.e., s ∈ δ i for all i = 1, . . . , n) and extends σ , i.e., n ≥ k and
Hence, t ∈ A and σ is an A-locking sequence for t. But δ extends σ and is sound for t, so (by the definition of σ being an A-locking sequence for t), we have that L(δ ) ⊆ A, which concludes the proof of Claim 1.
Proof of Claim 2: Let V be a stream for s that extends σ (such a stream must exist, since σ is sound for s: just take any stream for s and prefix it with σ ). Then, for every n ≥ k, the sequence δ n = (V 1 , . . . ,V n ) is sound for s and extends σ . Hence, by the above Claim, we must have that L S (V 1 , . . . ,V n ) ⊆ A for all n ≥ k. But we assumed that A is verifiable in the limit, so we must have s ∈ A, which concludes the proof of Claim 2.
From Claims 1 and 2 together, we conclude that σ is an A-locking sequence for s ∈ A, hence s ∈ L σ A .
Theorem 1. Given an epistemic space (S, O), a set A ⊆ S is verifiable in the limit iff it is ω-constructible.
Proof. (⇐) Assume A = n (U n ∩C n ) is a countable disjoint union of (mutually disjoint) locally closed sets U n ∩ C n (with U n open and C n closed). We define a standard agent L for A on finite data sequences
n holds for the first index n ∈ ω such that j O j ⊆ U n ; and L(S, δ ) = A otherwise. Then it is easy to see that L verifies A in the limit.
(⇒) Suppose that A is verifiable in the limit. By Proposition 1, it is then verifiable by a standard agent L. By Lemma 1, A is the union of all sets L σ A for all finite data sequences σ . But there are only countably many such sequences, so this is a countable union. Moreover, by Lemma 2, each L σ A is locally closed. Hence A is a countable union of locally closed sets, i.e., an ω-constructible set. Proof.
Corollary 1. A is decidable in the limit iff both
(1) ⇒ (2) : Let P be a solvable problem. By Proposition 1, there exists some standard agent that solves it. Let L be such a standard agent that solves P. Claim: Every answer A ∈ Q is verifiable in the limit.
Proof of Claim:
Let A ∈ Q be an answer. We construct a standard agent L A that verifies it, by setting
It is easy to see that L A verifies A. Using the Claim and Lemma 3, we obtain that, for each answer A ∈ Q, there exists some data sequence σ ∈ O * such that L S (σ ) ⊆ A. But O * is countable, so there can be only countably many answers in Q.
By the claim above, Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, we obtain that every answer A ∈ Q is a countable union of locally closed sets, hence it is ω-constructible.
(2) ⇒ (3) : By (2), Q is (at most) countable, say Q = {A i | i ∈ ω}, and also each answer A I ∈ Q is ω-constructible, hence it can be written as a countable disjoint union of locally closets A = k∈ω A k i (where all A k i 's locally closed and mutually disjoint). Then the question {A k i | i ∈ ω, k ∈ ω} is a refinement of Q, which is countable and locally closed. (3) ⇒ (1) : Let Q ′ = {B i | i ∈ ω} be a countable closed refinement of Q ′ . By Corollary 1, every answer B ∈ Q ′ is decidable, and so by Proposition 1, we can choose for each B i ∈ Q some standard agent L i that decides B i . We define now a new standard agent L, by:
It is easy to see that this agent L solves Q ′ , and since Q ′ is a refinement of Q, L also solves Q.
Corollary 2. An epistemic space S = (S, O) is learnable in the limit iff it is countable and satisfies the T D separation axiom.
Proof. Apply Theorem 2 to the learning question {{s} | s ∈ S}, noticing that the fact that all its answers are ω-constructible is equivalent to all singletons being locally closed, which is just another formulation of the T D axiom.
Universality of Conditioning
Our aim in this section is to show that AGM conditioning is "universal": every solvable problem can be solved by some AGM agent. First, we introduce an auxiliary notion, that of a problem being directly solvable by AGM conditioning.
Given a question Q on an epistemic space (S, O), any total order ⊆ Q × Q on (the answers of) the question Q induces in a canonical way a total preorder ≤⊆ S × S, obtained by:
where A s is the unique answer A s ∈ Q such that s ∈ A s ).
Definition 11. A problem P = (S, Q) is directly solvable by conditioning if it is solvable by AGM conditioning with respect to (a prior ≤ that is canonically induced, as explained above, by) a total order
⊆ Q × Q on (the answers of) the question Q.
Direct solvability by conditioning essentially means that the problem can be solved by a conditioning agent who does not attempt to refine the original question: she forms beliefs only about the answers to the given question, and is thus indifferent between states satisfying the same answer. Direct solvability by conditioning is thus a very stringent condition, and unsurprisingly this form of conditioning is not universal.
Proposition 5. (K. Genin, personal communication) Not every solvable problem is directly solvable by conditioning.
Proof. Let P be the problem in Example 3, depicted on the left-hand side of Figure 1 . It is easy to see that this problem cannot be directly solvable by conditioning. Indeed, if {t, u} ⊳ {s, v} then v is not learnable by ⊳-conditioning; if {s, v} < {t, u} then t is not learnable by ⊳-conditioning; while if {t, u} and {s, v} are equally plausible, then neither t nor v are learnable.
But P can be refined to a directly solvable problem, namely the "learning question" P ′ (depicted on the right-hand side of Figure 1 ), which can be directly solvable (e.g. if we set {t} ⊳ {s} ⊳ {v} ⊳ {u}). As a consequence, P can itself be solved by (non-direct) conditioning (with respect to the order t < s < v < u).
This counterexample suggests a way to prove our intended universality result: it is enough to show that every solvable problem has a refinement that is directly solvable by conditioning. To do this, we first need a structural characterization of direct solvability. Proof. Left-to-right implication: Suppose that P is directly solvable by conditioning with respect to (a prior ≤ that is canonically induced by) a total order ⊆ Q ×Q. i=1 O s i ∈ τ S , so that we have s ∈ U s and Min ≤ U s ⊆ A s . Then set U A := s∈A U s ∈ τ S for every answer A ∈ Q. We claim that U A "separates" A from the union of all the answers B ⊳ A (as linear separation demands): indeed, by the construction of U A , it is obvious that (1) A ⊆ U A , and also that Min ≤ U A ⊆ A. By unfolding the last clause in terms of , we obtain that: A B holds for all B ∈ Q such that U A ∩ B = / 0. Since is a total order on Q, this is equivalent to: (2) U A ∩ B = / 0 for all B ⊳ A. By (1) and (2) together, we obtain that Q is linearly separated.
Right-to-left implication: Suppose Q is linearly separated. Let be a total order on Q that linearly separates it. This means that, for every answer A ∈ Q, there exists some open set U A ∈ τ S such that A ⊆ U A and U A ∩ B = / 0 for all B ⊳ A. For each s ∈ S, we set U s := U A s (where A s is the unique answer A s ∈ Q with s ∈ A s ).
Let ≤ be the total preorder on S canonically induced by the order ⊆ Q × Q (by s ≤ t iff A s A t ). We show now that P is directly solvable by conditioning with respect to ≤. For this, let s ∈ S be any state, and O = (O n ) n∈ω be a sound and complete stream for s. Completeness of the stream implies that there must exist some N ∈ ω such that
To conclude our proof, it is enough to show the following Claim: For every n ≥ N, we have
First, let us see why this Claim is enough to give us direct solvability by conditioning. The fact that
0, for all n ≥ N. A previous observation tells us that, when applied to such data streams, the AGM agent L ≤ produces a "principal filter", given by
By the Claim above we have Min
Proof of Claim: Let n ≥ N. To prove the Claim, it is enough to show the following two implications (for all states t): Proof. Let P be a solvable problem. From Theorem 2, Proposition 3 and Lemma 2, it follows that P has a linearly separated refinement P ′ . By Lemma 5, that refinement is (directly) solvable by an AGM agent L ≤ . It is obvious (from the definition of solvability) that any doxastic agent which solves the more refined problem P ′ solves also the original problem P.
Corollary 3. AGM conditioning is a universal learning method, i.e., every learnable space is learnable by some AGM agent.
Proof. Apply the previous result to the finest question Q := {{s} | s ∈ S}.
In contrast, recall that the counterexample in Proposition 2 showed that standard AGM agents have a very limited problem-solving power. Standard conditioning is not a universal learning method (while general AGM conditioning is universal). This means that allowing prior plausibility orders that are nonwellfounded is essential for achieving universality of conditioning. Beliefs generated in this way may occasionally fail to be globally consistent. (Indeed, note that in the counterexample from Proposition 2, the beliefs of the non-standard AGM agent who learns the space are initially globally inconsistent. In conclusion, occasional global inconsistencies are the unavoidable price for the universality of AGM conditioning.
Conclusions and Connections to Other Work
The general topological setting for problem-solving assumed here is a variation of the one championed by Kelly in various talks [23] and in unpublished work [24, 25] , though until recently we did not realize this close similarity. Our topological characterizations of verifiable, falsifiable and decidable properties are generalizations of results by Kelly [20] , who proved characterizations for the special case of Baire spaces. 10 Our result on learning-universality (Corollary 3) is also a generalization of analogue results by Kelly [21, 26] , and Kelly, Schulte and Hendricks [19] . But our generalization to arbitrary spaces is highly non-trivial, requiring the use of the T D characterization. In contrast, the Baire space satisfies the much stronger separation axiom T 1, which trivializes the specialization order, and so the proof of learning-universality is much easier in this special case: any total ω-like ordering of the space can be used for conditioning. Nevertheless, in a sense, this result is just a topological re-packaging of one of our own previous results [13, 3, 4] .
While writing this paper, we learned that our T D characterization of learnability (Corollary 2) was independently re-proven by Konstantin Genin ([11] , unpublished manuscript), soon after we announced its proof. This characterization is actually a topological translation of a classical characterization of identifiability in the limit [2] , and in fact it also follows from a result by de Brecht and Yamamoto [9] , who prove it for so-called "concept spaces".
Our key new results are far-reaching and highly non-trivial: the topological characterization of solvability (Theorem 2), and the universality of AGM condition for problem-solving (Theorem 3). They required the introduction of new topological concepts (e.g., pseudo-stratifications and linearly separated partitions), and some non-trivial proofs of new topological results.
Philosophically, the importance of these results is that, on the one hand they fully vindicate the general topological program in Inductive Epistemology started by Kelly and others [20, 30] , and on the other hand they reassert the power and applicability of the AGM Belief Revision Theory against its critics. To this conclusion, we need to add an important proviso: our results show that, in order to achieve problemsolving universality, AGM agents need to (a) be "creative", by going beyond the original problem (i.e., finding a more refined problem that can be solved directly, and forming prior beliefs about the answer to this more refined question), and (b) admit non-standard priors, which occasionally will lead to beliefs that are globally inconsistent (although still locally consistent). Such occasional global inconsistencies can give rise to a type of "infinite Lottery Paradox". But this is the price that AGM agents have to pay in order to be able to solve every solvable question. Whether or not this is a price that is worth paying is a different, more vague and more "ideological" question, although a very interesting one. But this question lies beyond the scope of this paper.
